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generous toward specific identified victims than toward “statistical” victims who are yet to be identified. In the
study presented in this article we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We find that people are
more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified, wrongdoers, even when
identifying the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information about him or her. To account for the effect of
identifiability on both generosity and punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger
toward an identified than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with such an account, the effect of
identifiability on punishing behavior was mediated by self‐reported anger.
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Abstract 
 
 Prior research has found that people are more generous toward an identifiable 
(determinate) victim than toward a statistical (indeterminate) victim.  In the present study, 
we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness.  We find that people are more 
punitive toward determinate wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but indeterminate, 
wrongdoers, even when determining the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information 
about him or her.   To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and 
punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger toward a 
determinate than toward an unidentified target.  Consistent with such an account, the 
effect of determinateness on punishing behavior was mediated by anger and blame.  
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…it is in particular instances only that the propriety or impropriety, the merit or 
demerit, of actions is very obvious or discernible…..When we consider virtue and 
vice in an abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these 
several sentiments seem in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments 
themselves becomes less obvious and discernable. 
             Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
Past research has shown that human empathy differs reliably toward actual, 
'identified', victims on the one hand, and more abstract or 'statistical' victims on the other 
(Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003).  As 
Schelling (1968) wrote in what may have been the first explicit treatment of the 
phenomenon, “the death of a particular person invokes “anxiety and sentiment, guilt and 
awe, responsibility and religion, [but]…most of this awesomeness disappears when we 
deal with statistical death.”  Schelling’s passage not only identifies the phenomenon, but 
also proposes a plausible psychological mechanism involving emotions.  It suggests that 
identifiable victims evoke sympathy and a sense of moral responsibility that is lacking in 
considerations of statistical victims. 
In this paper we examine whether the discrepancy in treatment of statistical and 
identifiable victims noted by Schelling and supported by subsequent research might be a 
special case of a more general phenomenon that could be termed an identifiable other 
effect  whereby any identifiable target evokes a stronger emotional and moral reaction 
than an equivalent, but unidentifiable target.   If identifiable targets of any type produce 
stronger emotional reactions, then identification should also tend to intensify negative 
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feelings, if these are the dominant emotional reactions to a target.  This is the prediction 
we test in the current paper. 
Specifically, we test for an effect of identifiably on punitiveness, adapting a 
research design borrowed from our earlier work on the identifiable victim effect (Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003).  The original design was intended to get around the problem that 
identifying a victim generally means providing information about him or her, so it is 
always possible that any observed increment in empathy toward identifiable victims 
could be due to the specific information provided about the victim rather than to 
identifiability per se.  Our study avoided this problem by identifying victims without 
providing any information about them, a manipulation that we called “determinateness.”  
 In one of the earlier studies, we assigned each member of a group of research 
participants with a number and endowed each with $10.  Based on a drawing of numbers, 
half – the 'victims' -- were made to return the money.  We then gave each of the 
participants who had retained the $10 the opportunity to share their money with one of 
those who had lost their endowment.   In the determinate (identifiable) condition, the 
potential giver first drew the number of one victim from a bag, then decided how much to 
give to that victim (knowing, however, that he/she would never learn the actual identity 
of the victim).  In the indeterminate (unidentifiable) condition, in contrast, the potential 
giver decided how much to give just before drawing the victim's number.  Donations 
were about twice as large, on average, in the determinate condition as in the 
indeterminate condition, despite the fact that determining the victim provided no 
information about them.  Follow-up research, in which we raised money for the 
Identifiability and punitiveness 5 
 
charitable organization "Habitat for Humanity," revealed a similar effect in a more 
naturalistic setting.  
Beyond generalizing the earlier work beyond reactions to victims, the current 
study also examines whether any observed differences in the punitiveness exhibited 
toward determinate and indeterminate perpetrators would be mediated by different 
affective reactions.  Adam Smith's assertion that "when we consider virtue and vice in an 
abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these several sentiments 
seem in a great measure to disappear," as well as Schelling's contention that identified 
victims evoke "anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe," both reveal an implicit theory that 
identification matters because it leads to more intense emotional reactions.  The work of 
Sherman and colleagues (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Beike and Ryalls, 
1999) further supports the idea that people use distinct processes to make judgments of 
specific as opposed to general targets, and specifically the idea that generalities tend to 
evoke semantic representations, whereas specific instances evoke 'episodic' 
representations.  We contend that the representations of specific, identifiable targets are 
highly affect-laden, engaging the perceiver at a particularly intense level.  But, such a 
mediating role of affect has not been tested, including in our own prior work, which 
examined generosity toward statistical and identifiable victims, but did not incorporate 
measures of affect. 
The relevant emotions to examine in the context of punitiveness, we assumed, 
would be anger and blame.  Prior research has show that perceived intentional harm 
evokes anger (Bentacourt & Blair, 1992) as well as blame (e.g., Shaver, 1985), and that 
these two emotions interact with one-another.  Anger, like sympathy, is a moral emotion, 
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which can produce strong inferences of blame (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1995); Blame, 
likewise, intensifies anger, such that anger and blame have a significant recursive 
relationship (Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1996). Moreover, reactions of anger and blame 
naturally induce a desire to punish (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Solomon, 1990).  
Hence, to the extent that identifiable wrongdoers evoke stronger emotional and moral 
reactions than unidentifiable wrongdoers, we should expect them to be punished more 
severely. 
Present Study 
 
Experiment Overview 
To test the effect of identifiability on punitiveness, we created a situation in which 
participants who had behaved cooperatively in a social dilemma at their own expense 
were given the opportunity to penalize another participant who had behaved in a self-
interested fashion at the expense of others.1  Analogous to our earlier study, identifiability 
was manipulated by having contributors make the decision either just before or just after 
they had drawn the identification number of a non-contributor.  Participants made real 
decisions about cooperating and punishing which affected their actual payoffs.  This is 
worth noting because of the emotional mechanism that we propose. If choices were 
merely hypothetical, we would expect less of an effect, or no effect at all, since people 
generally mispredict their emotions in a hypothetical context (e.g., Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, Welch, & Dunning, 2003).  
 We predicted that people would be more likely to punish, at their own expense, an 
identified (determinate) non-contributor more severely than an unidentified 
(indeterminate) non-contributor.  Second, when given a choice to penalize a non-
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contributor, participants would react with greater anger and blame toward an identified 
non-contributor than toward an unidentified non-contributor.  Finally, we predicted that 
the effect of identifiability (determinateness) on punishment would be mediated by 
feelings of anger and blame. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and forty undergraduate and masters’ students (58 females and 81 
males) at Carnegie Mellon University participated in the study. They received no 
participation fee other than whatever sum of money they earned from the game.  There 
were no significant gender differences on any measure, so male and female data were 
combined in all analyses. 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited in groups of ten.  They were seated facing away from 
one another and were instructed not to speak or turn around and look at one another 
during the course of the experiment.  The experimenter informed the participants that all 
decisions they made would be anonymous and that, at no point during or after the 
experiment, would anyone learn the identity of anyone in their group. Participants were 
told that they would receive their payments from the outcome of the game in sealed 
envelopes, so that they would learn only about their own payoff from the game.    
  At the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter had each 
participant draw a number from a bag containing pieces of paper labeled with numbers 
from 1-10; each participant drew a single number.  Participants were told that the 
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experiment would consist of two rounds.  Each participant then received the following 
written instructions for Round 1: 
At the beginning of Round 1 you, and every other participant, receive $5.  You 
and each of the other 9 group members must decide whether to contribute your $5 
to the group or to keep it for yourself.  If you contribute the money, then everyone 
in the group will receive $1.25 from you.  If you do not, then everyone in the 
group will receive nothing from you.  Therefore, your income from the 
experiment depends on what you do and what everyone else does.   
 
If everyone contributes all of their money, including you, then you will all make 
$11.25 (9 x $1.25). 
 
If everyone keeps their $5.00 and no one contributes theirs, then everyone will 
make $5.00.   
 
The most you can make would be if you keep your money and everyone else 
contributes, in which case you would make $16.25. 
 
The least you can make is $0.00 if you contribute your $5.00 and no one else did. 
 
There are many other possibilities, depending on exactly how many people decide 
to contribute their $5.00 to the group.   
 
Please make your choice here, buy checking one of the following: 
 
______ I will keep my $5.00 
 
______ I contribute my $5.00 to the group 
 
When you have made your decisions, please turn your packet over and wait for 
further instructions. 
 
 When all 10 participants had made their decisions, the experimenter collected the 
packets.  The experimenter then collected each participant’s number and inconspicuously 
placed the numbers of those who had not contributed in an envelope. The rest of the 
numbers were kept separate.   
 It was only at this point that the sample from which the data presented here 
became fixed; it consists of all participants who contributed in Round 1 and were 
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therefore enabled to punish.  Each was randomly assigned to either the indeterminate or 
determinate condition.  Those in the indeterminate condition received the following 
instructions: 
In this round, the choice you make will affect only one other group member.  
Remember that each group member either did not contribute or did contribute 
their $5.00 to the project in the first round.  You will at no time learn who 
contributed and who did not, nor will you learn how many people contributed and 
how many did not.   
 
To begin this round, each group member who contributed in round 1 will draw a 
number of another member of the same group, who did not contribute.  Each of 
you will know only the number of the person you draw, but will never find out 
who this person is.   
 
You now have the option of punishing this person for not contributing in round 1. 
Punishment comes at a cost to yourself though.  For every $.20 you pay out, they 
will be penalized $1.00 to a maximum punishment of $5.00 (costing you $1.00).   
 
Please check off how much you want to punish them.   
____don’t penalize 
____penalize by $1.00 (cost to you of $.20) 
____penalize by $2.00 (cost to you of $.40) 
____penalize by $3.00 (cost to you of $.60) 
____penalize by $4.00 (cost to you of $.80) 
____penalize by $5.00 (cost to you of $1.00) 
 
 Participants were instructed to raise their hand once they had made their decision. 
The experimenter approached them, one at a time, with the envelope containing numbers 
of non-contributors and the participant then drew the number of the person for whom 
they could penalize.  All numbers were replaced in the envelope so that in sessions in 
which over half of participants contributed and thus could penalize, there would always 
be numbers (of non-contributors) to draw.2 
 In the determinate condition, instructions for contributors were identical except 
that participants drew the number of the person to be penalized before making the 
decision.  In both conditions, after making the choice and drawing a number (in one 
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sequence or the other), participants were asked to rate on a likert scale (from 1-5) the 
degree of 1) anger, 2) blame, and 3) sympathy they felt for the non-contributing group 
member whose number they had drawn.3  Each participant who did not contribute in 
Round 1 was subject to any punishment selected by contributor(s) who drew their 
number.  
Results 
Descriptive results 
Of the 144 study participants, 55% (n=77) contributed to the group  in Round 1.  
In Round 2, of the 77 participants who contributed and thus could punish, 53.2% levied 
some punishment on a non-contributor (M = $1.79, Mdn. = $1).   
Penalties 
Since the dependent variable of ‘penalty’ was censored at $0, a Tobit regression 
was utilized (Tobin, 1958).  Our major hypothesis, that contributors would apply harsher 
penalties in the determinate condition than in the indeterminate condition, was supported, 
Χ 2 (1, 77) = 4.90, p = .03. The results are detailed in Table 1, and in Figure 1, which 
presents a frequency distribution of punishment amounts for the two experimental 
groups.  From the last row of the table, it is apparent that the determinateness 
manipulation affected the magnitude of penalties as well as the tendency to punish.  A 
greater proportion of participants punished a determinate target than an indeterminate 
target. Although the modal punishment was $0 for both conditions, the mean and median 
penalty was greater in the determinate condition.   
Emotional Reactions 
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We also predicted that contributors would react with greater anger and blame 
toward determinate non-contributors than toward indeterminate non-contributors.  
ANOVA results regressing penalties on each of these variables revealed significant 
differences in self-reported anger and blame (F(1, 75) = 25.79, p < .01 and F(1,75) = 
8.29, p < .03) respectively. There were no differences in self reported sympathy (F(2, 75) 
= .162, n.s.). 
Mediational analyses 
We predicted that the emotional reactions of anger and blame would mediate the 
effect of determinateness on punitiveness, and tested whether this was the case using 
Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger's (1998) test of mediation.  All of the criteria for full 
mediation were satisfied.  First, as reported above, there was a significant effect of 
determinateness on penalty.  Second, there was a significant relationship between 
determinateness and a composite measure of anger and blame obtained by averaging the 
two measures (F(1, 75)= 10.51, p<.01).  Third, when we regressed penalty on both 
determinateness and anger/blame, the effect of anger/blame was significant (β = 1.88), 
Χ 2 (1, 77) = 33.34, p <.01, but the effect of determinateness vanishes almost completely 
after anger/blame is controlled for (β = .04, n.s.).  These findings provide clear support 
for the hypothesis that identifiability affects behavior by evoking stronger emotions 
toward an identified target than toward an unidentified target.   
Discussion 
 The tendency toward more severe punishment for identifiable perpetrators, as 
demonstrated by our study, has important implications for public policy, and especially 
for jury decision making and the court system.   
Identifiability and punitiveness 12 
 
 Since criminal sentencing inevitably occurs with an identifiable defendant, a juror 
might feel anger and blame at a level that is not experienced by policy makers, when they 
established the guidelines of appropriate sanctions for particular offenses.  This 
heightened negative reaction toward offenders at the time of trial, coupled with greater 
sympathy for identifiable victims, might lead to harsher sanctions for actual cases than 
those set forth by legal guidelines.  On the other hand, in actual court cases, factors that 
elicit sympathy towards perpetrators, such as a difficult childhood or personal difficulties, 
could also have greater impact for identifiable perpetrators at trial than for unidentifiable 
perpetrators considered at the time when policy-makers determine generic sanction 
levels.   
 Identifiability could also explain an effective strategy of politicians-- drawing 
public attention toward a particular malevolent individual in order to garner support and 
mobilize aggressive actions against foreign regimes.  Just as focusing on an identifiable 
victim (e.g. the Brady bill) is exploited to win support of policies protecting victims, the 
emphasis on Saddam Hussein in political speeches and media coverage could serve as a 
lightening rod--successfully stirring up anger, thereby motivating a desire to right a 
wrong.  Other causes without such a salient identifiable perpetrator may seem less 
offensive and less in need of opposition.   
 More generally, this study supports the general conclusion that emotional 
reactions to other persons, as well as behaviors directed toward them, depend on a variety 
of non-normative factors.  For example, both punitiveness and giving have been found to 
depend on background mood states (Lerner et al., 1998; Small & Lerner, 2003).  
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 So far the ramifications of identification have only been demonstrated for 
empathy toward victims and punishment of perpetrators, but given the strength and the 
consistency of findings in these two areas, it seems likely to subsequent research will 
demonstrate a far broader range of applications and support the existence of a more 
general "identifiable other" effect. 
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Footnotes 
_____________________________ 
1 Similar procedures have been used in previous studies of punishing behavior (e.g., 
Fehr & Gachter, 2000). 
2 Contributors replaced drawn numbers due to the inevitable unevenness of the ratio of 
contributors to non-contributors in many rounds.  Therefore, some non-contributors’ 
numbers were drawn and potentially punished more than once and some were never 
drawn. 
3 In addition, we asked, “How likely do you think it is that the non-contributing group 
member will actually receive the penalty that you chose?” in order to assess the 
believability of the penalty. The mean responses were 3.27 (identifiable) vs. 3.26 
(unidentifiable), suggesting that believability was not affected by the experimental 
manipulation. 
 4  As an exploratory measure, non-contributors were given a hypothetical choice about 
 giving back any amount of their experiment payment to a contributor (either 
 indeterminate or determinate). Identifiability of the contributor had no effect on this 
 hypothetical choice.  This null result is unsurprising given that participants were 
 likely insufficiently engaged emotionally in the hypothetical task. 
  Punishment and Identifiability: 17  
  
Table 1 
Condition Indeterminate 
Non-contributor (n=38) 
Determinate 
Contributor (n=39) 
Mean $1.29 $2.28 
Standard Deviation $1.92 $2.21 
Median $0.00 $1.00 
Mode $0 $0 
Percent of $5.00  
(maximum) penalties 
15.8% 33.3% 
Percent of $0.00 
(minimum) penalties 
60.5% 35.9% 
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Figure 1 
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